Introduction: The basic arguments:

A. the Simple Argument:

1. I am essentially a simple entity

2. No physical body is a simple entity

3. Principle of indescernibility of identicals (If A and B are identical, then whatever is a property of A is a property of B)

4. Therefore, I am not identical with my (or any) physical body.

B. Valid but its soundness is questioned

C. The Modal Argument:

Principle of indescernibility of identicals

I have the essential property of being such that I could exist without a body.

No physical body has the essential property of being such that I could exist without a body.

Therefore, I am not identical with my (or any) physical body.

D. What he will show:

1. 5 is supported by conceivability

2. But he will argue that 5 can be known only if 4 is first known—so, the modal argument is circular (i.e., one must first know 4 before knowing 5, rather than vice versa)

3. To know that I and my body are distinct entities, I must know some property that enables me to know their distinctness

4. The self is simple and the body is complex—so simplicity is such a property (of the mind)

5. Good reasons to hold that the argument from simplicity will have to be the central argument

The Modal Argument

McGinn’s argument:

1. The relation between self and body seems contingent (that is, it seems that the self can exist w/o the body) only because I am not aware of a necessary connection between them (their identity)

2. But not to be aware of a necessary relation is not the same as being aware of their contingent relation -- lack of awareness of a property establishing identity or necessary connection does not = being aware of their distinctness

3. We can conceive of the self existing w/o the body only because we are unaware of their necessary connection—still, they might have a necessary connection that is just unknown to us

Taliaferro’s Defense and Goetz’ Reply

4. Weakly conceiving something vs. strongly conceiving something

i. strongly = we have a positive grasp of a property that entails their (self and body) distinction

ii. weakly = lack awareness of their necessary connection (i.e. identity)

5. Goetz’s question: what properties are grasped that ground the strong conception of their distinction?

6. Psychological properties (nature of thinking, believing and desiring) ground only a property dualism according to Taliafero (and Goetz obviously agrees)

7. E.g., I can positively conceive of my existing outside West Chicago in virtue of my prior knowledge of the distinction between me and West Chicago

8. Likewise, for conceivability (of my existing outside my body): I must first be aware of myself and my body as distinct entities

9. So: Taliafero needs to specify some property that allows him to strongly conceive the possibility that does not presuppose their distinctness

10. Won’t work to say: I grasp the absence of a property of connection—for, that would be positively to grasp the contingent relation, something I don’t do

11. Taliafero: many nondualists concede they can conceive of existing w/o their bodies—so, the Modal argument is not circular --- But, as with D.A. Armstrong, this is only a weak conceivability, as Armstrong claims: no reason to believe that the mind is self-intimating (which one would have to hold to believe in a strong conceivability)

Yablo’s defense

12. Yablo: p is conceivable for me = p is imagninable by me

13. Reply: imagination is indeterminate (have I included all relevant elements or not?) but that means this gives only weak conceivability

14. the Hesperus Phosphorus example: but this actually supports the circularity charge:

Simplicity and Complexity

1. Simplicity would work as a property grounding strong conceivability (of the body existing without the mind, in that I can grasp the distinction of my self from my body)

2. Basic argument: The self is simple, the body is not simple, therefore etc.

3. Are there any other such properties? Doesn’t seem so: it’s doubtful one could be aware of the property of nonspatiality (e.g.) w/o first being aware of one’s simplicity

4. Even if one were aware of being disembodied (e.g. an out of body experience in the operating room) that would not tell you you are non-physical—for that, you must use the simplicity argument (that one is not identical to any body, not just the one you’re separate from)

Can’t rule out atomism (the idea that some bodies are not complex and that one is a simple body, and spatial)

Are we aware of our simplicity?

5. Standoff: seem to be, but some point to commissurotomy cases

6. In any case, if there is a successful argument for dualism it is the simplicity argument, not the modal argument