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Naturalism is an approach to
philosophical problems that interprets them as tractable through the
methods of the empirical sciences or at least, without a distinctively a
priori project of theorizing. For much of the history of philosophy it
has been widely held that philosophy involved a distinctive method, and
could achieve knowledge distinct from that attained by the special
sciences. Thus, metaphysics and epistemology have often jointly occupied
a position of ‘first philosophy,’ laying the necessary grounds for the
understanding of reality and the justification of knowledge claims.
Naturalism rejects philosophy’s claim to that special status. Whether in
epistemology, ethics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, or
other areas naturalism seeks to show that philosophical problems as
traditionally conceived are ill-formulated, and can be solved or
displaced by appropriately naturalistic methods. Naturalism often
assigns a key role to the methods and results of the empirical sciences,
and sometimes aspires to reductionism and physicalism. However, there
are many versions of naturalism and some are explicitly non-scientistic.
What they share is a repudiation of the view of philosophy as
exclusively a priori theorizing concerned with a distinctively
philosophical set of questions. Naturalistic thinking has a long
history, but it has been especially prominent in recent decades, and its
influence is felt all across philosophy. We will look at why and in what
ways it is prominent and we will describe some of the most influential
versions of naturalism.
2. The Basic Elements of
Naturalism Concerning Reality and Knowledge
The debate about naturalism ranges across many areas of philosophy,
including metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and philosophy of mind,
just to mention areas where it is especially prominent. There are two
basic dimensions in which the debate takes place. One of them concerns
(to put it simply) what there is, and the other concerns methods of
acquiring belief and knowledge. There are several affiliated issues
(supervenience, objectivity, various realism/antirealism debates, the
character of norms of epistemic justification, the theory of meaning,
and so forth) but they are all connected through those two main
concerns.
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a. What There Is
With respect to the first, the naturalist maintains that all of what
there is belongs to the natural world. Obviously, a great deal turns on
how nature is understood. But the key point is that an accurate,
adequate conception of the world does not (according to the naturalist)
include reference to supernatural entities or agencies. According to the
naturalist, there are no Platonic forms, Cartesian mental substances,
Kantian noumena, or any other agents, powers, or entities that do not
(in some broad sense) belong to nature. As a very loose
characterization, it may suffice to say that nature is the order of
things accessible to us through observation and the methods of the
empirical sciences. If some other method, such as a priori theorizing,
is needed to have access to the alleged entity or to the truth in
question, then it is not a real entity or a genuine truth. According to
the naturalist, there is only the natural order. If something is
postulated or claimed to exist, but is not described in the vocabulary
that describes natural phenomena, and not studied by the inquiries that
study natural phenomena, it is not something we should recognize as
real.
Unsurprisingly, the success of the sciences has been one of the main
motivations for thinkers to embrace naturalism. The sciences have proved
to be powerful tools for making the world intelligible. They seem to
have such a strong claim to yield genuine knowledge that it is widely
thought that whatever there is, is a proper object of science. That does
not require that in embracing naturalism one also embrace determinism,
physicalism, and reductionism. (However, it is true that many advocates
of some or all of those are also very often naturalists.) While those
specific theses about the structure or character of the world are not
essential features of naturalism, many who endorse naturalism believe
that over time scientific progress will make the case for physicalism,
in particular. Even if, for example, attempts to provide fully reductive
accounts of mental phenomena, certain biological phenomena, and values
do not succeed, that would not be an insurmountable impediment to
physicalism; or, at least that is the view of some defenders of
naturalism. There is only the physical natural order, even if
there are various constituents and aspects of it that are to be
described in their own non-reducible vocabularies.
Naturalism could be said to involve a denial that there is any
distinctively metaphysical area of inquiry. Thus, even if one's
preferred interpretation of naturalism is not reductionist or even
physicalist (in a non-reductionist form), naturalism is a conception of
reality as homogeneous in the sense that there is one natural order that
comprises all of reality. There are no objects or properties that can
only be identified or comprehended by metaphysical theorizing or
non-empirical understanding. What exactly is the true theory of that
single natural order may remain open to dispute. The key points are that
our conception of reality need include nothing that is exclusively
accessible to a priori theorizing, or to 'first philosophy’, and there
is only one natural order.
B. A Free Man's Worship
by Bertrand Russell 
A brief introduction: "A Free Man's Worship" (first published as
"The Free Man's Worship" in Dec. 1903) is perhaps Bertrand Russell's
best known and most reprinted essay. Its mood and language have often
been explained, even by Russell himself, as reflecting a particular time
in his life; "it depend(s)," he wrote in 1929, "upon a metaphysic which
is more platonic than that which I now believe in." Yet the essay sounds
many characteristic Russellian themes and preoccupations and deserves
consideration--and further serious study--as an historical landmark of
early-twentieth-century European thought. For a scholarly edition with
some documentation, see Volume 12 of The Collected Papers of Bertrand
Russell, entitled Contemplation and Action, 1902-14 (London,
1985; now published by Routledge).
To Dr. Faustus in his study Mephistopheles told the history of the
Creation, saying:
"The endless praises of the choirs of angels had begun to grow
wearisome; for, after all, did he not deserve their praise? Had he not
given them endless joy? Would it not be more amusing to obtain
undeserved praise, to be worshipped by beings whom he tortured? He
smiled inwardly, and resolved that the great drama should be performed.
"For countless ages the hot nebula whirled aimlessly through space.
At length it began to take shape, the central mass threw off planets,
the planets cooled, boiling seas and burning mountains heaved and
tossed, from black masses of cloud hot sheets of rain deluged the barely
solid crust. And now the first germ of life grew in the depths of the
ocean, and developed rapidly in the fructifying warmth into vast forest
trees, huge ferns springing from the damp mould, sea monsters breeding,
fighting, devouring, and passing away. And from the monsters, as the
play unfolded itself, Man was born, with the power of thought, the
knowledge of good and evil, and the cruel thirst for worship. And Man
saw that all is passing in this mad, monstrous world, that all is
struggling to snatch, at any cost, a few brief moments of life before
Death's inexorable decree. And Man said: `There is a hidden purpose,
could we but fathom it, and the purpose is good; for we must reverence
something, and in the visible world there is nothing worthy of
reverence.' And Man stood aside from the struggle, resolving that God
intended harmony to come out of chaos by human efforts. And when he
followed the instincts which God had transmitted to him from his
ancestry of beasts of prey, he called it Sin, and asked God to forgive
him. But he doubted whether he could be justly forgiven, until he
invented a divine Plan by which God's wrath was to have been appeased.
And seeing the present was bad, he made it yet worse, that thereby the
future might be better. And he gave God thanks for the strength that
enabled him to forgo even the joys that were possible. And God smiled;
and when he saw that Man had become perfect in renunciation and worship,
he sent another sun through the sky, which crashed into Man's sun; and
all returned again to nebula.
"`Yes,' he murmured, `it was a good play; I will have it performed
again.'"
Such, in outline, but even more purposeless, more void of meaning,
is the world which Science presents for our belief. Amid such a world,
if anywhere, our ideals henceforward must find a home. That Man is the
product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving;
that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his
beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms; that
no fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve
an individual life beyond the grave; that all the labours of the ages,
all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of
human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar
system, and that the whole temple of Man's achievement must inevitably
be buried beneath the debris of a universe in ruins--all these things,
if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain, that no
philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand. Only within the
scaffolding of these truths, only on the firm foundation of unyielding
despair, can the soul's habitation henceforth be safely built.
How, in such an alien and inhuman world, can so powerless a creature
as Man preserve his aspirations untarnished? A strange mystery it is
that Nature, omnipotent but blind, in the revolutions of her secular
hurryings through the abysses of space, has brought forth at last a
child, subject still to her power, but gifted with sight, with knowledge
of good and evil, with the capacity of judging all the works of his
unthinking Mother. In spite of Death, the mark and seal of the parental
control, Man is yet free, during his brief years, to examine, to
criticise, to know, and in imagination to create. To him alone, in the
world with which he is acquainted, this freedom belongs; and in this
lies his superiority to the resistless forces that control his outward
life.
The savage, like ourselves, feels the oppression of his impotence
before the powers of Nature; but having in himself nothing that he
respects more than Power, he is willing to prostrate himself before his
gods, without inquiring whether they are worthy of his worship. Pathetic
and very terrible is the long history of cruelty and torture, of
degradation and human sacrifice, endured in the hope of placating the
jealous gods: surely, the trembling believer thinks, when what is most
precious has been freely given, their lust for blood must be appeased,
and more will not be required. The religion of Moloch--as such creeds
may be generically called--is in essence the cringing submission of the
slave, who dare not, even in his heart, allow the thought that his
master deserves no adulation. Since the independence of ideals is not
yet acknowledged, Power may be freely worshipped, and receive an
unlimited respect, despite its wanton infliction of pain.
But gradually, as morality grows bolder, the claim of the ideal
world begins to be felt; and worship, if it is not to cease, must be
given to gods of another kind than those created by the savage. Some,
though they feel the demands of the ideal, will still consciously reject
them, still urging that naked Power is worthy of worship. Such is the
attitude inculcated in God's answer to Job out of the whirlwind: the
divine power and knowledge are paraded, but of the divine goodness there
is no hint. Such also is the attitude of those who, in our own day, base
their morality upon the struggle for survival, maintaining that the
survivors are necessarily the fittest. But others, not content with an
answer so repugnant to the moral sense, will adopt the position which we
have become accustomed to regard as specially religious, maintaining
that, in some hidden manner, the world of fact is really harmonious with
the world of ideals. Thus Man creates God, all-powerful and all-good,
the mystic unity of what is and what should be.
But the world of fact, after all, is not good; and, in submitting
our judgment to it, there is an element of slavishness from which our
thoughts must be purged. For in all things it is well to exalt the
dignity of Man, by freeing him as far as possible from the tyranny of
non-human Power. When we have realised that Power is largely bad, that
man, with his knowledge of good and evil, is but a helpless atom in a
world which has no such knowledge, the choice is again presented to us:
Shall we worship Force, or shall we worship Goodness? Shall our God
exist and be evil, or shall he be recognised as the creation of our own
conscience?
The answer to this question is very momentous, and affects
profoundly our whole morality. The worship of Force, to which Carlyle
and Nietzsche and the creed of Militarism have accustomed us, is the
result of failure to maintain our own ideals against a hostile universe:
it is itself a prostrate submission to evil, a sacrifice of our best to
Moloch. If strength indeed is to be respected, let us respect rather the
strength of those who refuse that false "recognition of facts" which
fails to recognise that facts are often bad. Let us admit that, in the
world we know, there are many things that would be better otherwise, and
that the ideals to which we do and must adhere are not realised in the
realm of matter. Let us preserve our respect for truth, for beauty, for
the ideal of perfection which life does not permit us to attain, though
none of these things meet with the approval of the unconscious universe.
If Power is bad, as it seems to be, let us reject it from our hearts. In
this lies Man's true freedom: in determination to worship only the God
created by our own love of the good, to respect only the heaven which
inspires the insight of our best moments. In action, in desire, we must
submit perpetually to the tyranny of outside forces; but in thought, in
aspiration, we are free, free from our fellow-men, free from the petty
planet on which our bodies impotently crawl, free even, while we live,
from the tyranny of death. Let us learn, then, that energy of faith
which enables us to live constantly in the vision of the good; and let
us descend, in action, into the world of fact, with that vision always
before us.
When first the opposition of fact and ideal grows fully visible, a
spirit of fiery revolt, of fierce hatred of the gods, seems necessary to
the assertion of freedom. To defy with Promethean constancy a hostile
universe, to keep its evil always in view, always actively hated, to
refuse no pain that the malice of Power can invent, appears to be the
duty of all who will not bow before the inevitable. But indignation is
still a bondage, for it compels our thoughts to be occupied with an evil
world; and in the fierceness of desire from which rebellion springs
there is a kind of self-assertion which it is necessary for the wise to
overcome. Indignation is a submission of our thoughts, but not of our
desires; the Stoic freedom in which wisdom consists is found in the
submission of our desires, but not of our thoughts. From the submission
of our desires springs the virtue of resignation; from the freedom of
our thoughts springs the whole world of art and philosophy, and the
vision of beauty by which, at last, we half reconquer the reluctant
world. But the vision of beauty is possible only to unfettered
contemplation, to thoughts not weighted by the load of eager wishes; and
thus Freedom comes only to those who no longer ask of life that it shall
yield them any of those personal goods that are subject to the mutations
of Time.
Although the necessity of renunciation is evidence of the existence
of evil, yet Christianity, in preaching it, has shown a wisdom exceeding
that of the Promethean philosophy of rebellion. It must be admitted
that, of the things we desire, some, though they prove impossible, are
yet real goods; others, however, as ardently longed for, do not form
part of a fully purified ideal. The belief that what must be renounced
is bad, though sometimes false, is far less often false than untamed
passion supposes; and the creed of religion, by providing a reason for
proving that it is never false, has been the means of purifying our
hopes by the discovery of many austere truths.
But there is in resignation a further good element: even real goods,
when they are unattainable, ought not to be fretfully desired. To every
man comes, sooner or later, the great renunciation. For the young, there
is nothing unattainable; a good thing desired with the whole force of a
passionate will, and yet impossible, is to them not credible. Yet, by
death, by illness, by poverty, or by the voice of duty, we must learn,
each one of us, that the world was not made for us, and that, however
beautiful may be the things we crave, Fate may nevertheless forbid them.
It is the part of courage, when misfortune comes, to bear without
repining the ruin of our hopes, to turn away our thoughts from vain
regrets. This degree of submission to Power is not only just and right:
it is the very gate of wisdom.
But passive renunciation is not the whole of wisdom; for not by
renunciation alone can we build a temple for the worship of our own
ideals. Haunting foreshadowings of the temple appear in the realm of
imagination, in music, in architecture, in the untroubled kingdom of
reason, and in the golden sunset magic of lyrics, where beauty shines
and glows, remote from the touch of sorrow, remote from the fear of
change, remote from the failures and disenchantments of the world of
fact. In the contemplation of these things the vision of heaven will
shape itself in our hearts, giving at once a touchstone to judge the
world about us, and an inspiration by which to fashion to our needs
whatever is not incapable of serving as a stone in the sacred temple.
Except for those rare spirits that are born without sin, there is a
cavern of darkness to be traversed before that temple can be entered.
The gate of the cavern is despair, and its floor is paved with the
gravestones of abandoned hopes. There Self must die; there the
eagerness, the greed of untamed desire must be slain, for only so can
the soul be freed from the empire of Fate. But out of the cavern the
Gate of Renunciation leads again to the daylight of wisdom, by whose
radiance a new insight, a new joy, a new tenderness, shine forth to
gladden the pilgrim's heart.
When, without the bitterness of impotent rebellion, we have learnt
both to resign ourselves to the outward rules of Fate and to recognise
that the non-human world is unworthy of our worship, it becomes possible
at last so to transform and refashion the unconscious universe, so to
transmute it in the crucible of imagination, that a new image of shining
gold replaces the old idol of clay. In all the multiform facts of the
world--in the visual shapes of trees and mountains and clouds, in the
events of the life of man, even in the very omnipotence of Death--the
insight of creative idealism can find the reflection of a beauty which
its own thoughts first made. In this way mind asserts its subtle mastery
over the thoughtless forces of Nature. The more evil the material with
which it deals, the more thwarting to untrained desire, the greater is
its achievement in inducing the reluctant rock to yield up its hidden
treasures, the prouder its victory in compelling the opposing forces to
swell the pageant of its triumph. Of all the arts, Tragedy is the
proudest, the most triumphant; for it builds its shining citadel in the
very centre of the enemy's country, on the very summit of his highest
mountain; from its impregnable watchtowers, his camps and arsenals, his
columns and forts, are all revealed; within its walls the free life
continues, while the legions of Death and Pain and Despair, and all the
servile captains of tyrant Fate, afford the burghers of that dauntless
city new spectacles of beauty. Happy those sacred ramparts, thrice happy
the dwellers on that all-seeing eminence. Honour to those brave warriors
who, through countless ages of warfare, have preserved for us the
priceless heritage of liberty, and have kept undefiled by sacrilegious
invaders the home of the unsubdued.
But the beauty of Tragedy does but make visible a quality which, in
more or less obvious shapes, is present always and everywhere in life.
In the spectacle of Death, in the endurance of intolerable pain, and in
the irrevocableness of a vanished past, there is a sacredness, an
overpowering awe, a feeling of the vastness, the depth, the
inexhaustible mystery of existence, in which, as by some strange
marriage of pain, the sufferer is bound to the world by bonds of sorrow.
In these moments of insight, we lose all eagerness of temporary desire,
all struggling and striving for petty ends, all care for the little
trivial things that, to a superficial view, make up the common life of
day by day; we see, surrounding the narrow raft illumined by the
flickering light of human comradeship, the dark ocean on whose rolling
waves we toss for a brief hour; from the great night without, a chill
blast breaks in upon our refuge; all the loneliness of humanity amid
hostile forces is concentrated upon the individual soul, which must
struggle alone, with what of courage it can command, against the whole
weight of a universe that cares nothing for its hopes and fears.
Victory, in this struggle with the powers of darkness, is the true
baptism into the glorious company of heroes, the true initiation into
the overmastering beauty of human existence. From that awful encounter
of the soul with the outer world, enunciation, wisdom, and charity are
born; and with their birth a new life begins. To take into the inmost
shrine of the soul the irresistible forces whose puppets we seem to
be--Death and change, the irrevocableness of the past, and the
powerlessness of Man before the blind hurry of the universe from vanity
to vanity--to feel these things and know them is to conquer them.
This is the reason why the Past has such magical power. The beauty
of its motionless and silent pictures is like the enchanted purity of
late autumn, when the leaves, though one breath would make them fall,
still glow against the sky in golden glory. The Past does not change or
strive; like Duncan, after life's fitful fever it sleeps well; what was
eager and grasping, what was petty and transitory, has faded away, the
things that were beautiful and eternal shine out of it like stars in the
night. Its beauty, to a soul not worthy of it, is unendurable; but to a
soul which has conquered Fate it is the key of religion.
The life of Man, viewed outwardly, is but a small thing in
comparison with the forces of Nature. The slave is doomed to worship
Time and Fate and Death, because they are greater than anything he finds
in himself, and because all his thoughts are of things which they
devour. But, great as they are, to think of them greatly, to feel their
passionless splendour, is greater still. And such thought makes us free
men; we no longer bow before the inevitable in Oriental subjection, but
we absorb it, and make it a part of ourselves. To abandon the struggle
for private happiness, to expel all eagerness of temporary desire, to
burn with passion for eternal things--this is emancipation, and this is
the free man's worship. And this liberation is effected by a
contemplation of Fate; for Fate itself is subdued by the mind which
leaves nothing to be purged by the purifying fire of Time.
United with his fellow-men by the strongest of all ties, the tie of
a common doom, the free man finds that a new vision is with him always,
shedding over every daily task the light of love. The life of Man is a
long march through the night, surrounded by invisible foes, tortured by
weariness and pain, towards a goal that few can hope to reach, and where
none may tarry long. One by one, as they march, our comrades vanish from
our sight, seized by the silent orders of omnipotent Death. Very brief
is the time in which we can help them, in which their happiness or
misery is decided. Be it ours to shed sunshine on their path, to lighten
their sorrows by the balm of sympathy, to give them the pure joy of a
never-tiring affection, to strengthen failing courage, to instil faith
in hours of despair. Let us not weigh in grudging scales their merits
and demerits, but let us think only of their need--of the sorrows, the
difficulties, perhaps the blindnesses, that make the misery of their
lives; let us remember that they are fellow-sufferers in the same
darkness, actors in the same tragedy as ourselves. And so, when their
day is over, when their good and their evil have become eternal by the
immortality of the past, be it ours to feel that, where they suffered,
where they failed, no deed of ours was the cause; but wherever a spark
of the divine fire kindled in their hearts, we were ready with
encouragement, with sympathy, with brave words in which high courage
glowed.
Brief and powerless is Man's life; on him and all his race the slow,
sure doom falls pitiless and dark. Blind to good and evil, reckless of
destruction, omnipotent matter rolls on its relentless way; for Man,
condemned to-day to lose his dearest, to-morrow himself to pass through
the gate of darkness, it remains only to cherish, ere yet the blow
falls, the lofty thoughts that ennoble his little day; disdaining the
coward terrors of the slave of Fate, to worship at the shrine that his
own hands have built; undismayed by the empire of chance, to preserve a
mind free from the wanton tyranny that rules his outward life; proudly
defiant of the irresistible forces that tolerate, for a moment, his
knowledge and his condemnation, to sustain alone, a weary but unyielding
Atlas, the world that his own ideals have fashioned despite the
trampling march of unconscious power.
Electronic colophon: This electronic text was typed for the BRS
Home Page in July, 1996 by John R. Lenz from the 1929 U.S. edition (pp.
46-57) of Mysticism and Logic (orig. London, 1918). I used a copy
of this book signed by BR himself. Russell's signature in the title of
this electronic version is that very signature, which I reproduced using
a scanner and irony: another essay in the same collection is "The
Place of Science in a Liberal Education."
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